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ABSTRACT
This study aims to analyze budgetary slack at the management level. This 
budgetary slack is viewed from several independent variables consisting 
of participatory budgeting, information asymmetry, and organizational 
commitment by making managers spread across the city of Surabaya as the 
research samples. Participatory budgeting is budgeting that involves all 
levels of personnel in preparing the budget. The opportunity for employees 
to participate in preparing the budget is closely related to the level of 
budgetary slack. Information asymmetry is the difference in information 
held between the principal and the agent. Organizational commitment can 
be interpreted as a situation where the executives stay in an organization 
where they work and are committed to their work. This study uses a 
quantitative approach involving multiple linear regression analysis. The 
results show that participatory budgeting has no effect on budgetary slack, 
while information asymmetry and organizational commitment have an 
effect on budgetary slack.
ABSTRAK
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis kesenjangan anggaran 
yang terjadi di tingkat manajemen. Kesenjangan anggaran ini ditinjau 
dari beberapa variable independen yang terdri dari partisipasi anggaran, 
asimetri informasi, dan komitmen organisasi dengan menjadikan manajer 
yang tersebar di kota Surabaya sebagai sampel. Penganggaran partisipatif 
merupakan penganggaran yang melibatkan seluruh lapisan personel dalam 
menyusun anggaran. Adanya kesempatan bagi karyawan untuk ikut serta 
dalam menyusun anggaran erat kaitannya dengan tingkat kesenjangan 
dalam anggaran tersebut. Asimetri Informasi adalah perbedaan informasi 
yang dimiliki oleh prinsipal dengan agen. Komitmen organisasi dapat 
diartikan sebagai suatu keadaan dimana eksekutif bertahan pada suatu 
organisasi dan berkomitmen dalam pekerjaannya. Pendekatan yang 
digunakan dalam penelitian ini yaitu pendekatan kuantitatif dengan 
menggunakan uji regresi linier berganda. Hasil uji pengaruh menyatakan 
bahwa partisipasi anggaran tidak berpengaruh terhadap senjangan 
anggaran sedangkan informasi asimetri dan komitmen organisasi 
berpengaruh terhadap senjangan anggaran. 
1. INTRODUCTION
Budgetary slack is the difference between the 
amount of the budget reported by the agent 
and the company’s best estimate (Anthony 
and Govindaradjan, 2011). Agency theory 
states that agents tend to propose budgets 
by lowering revenues and increasing costs 
compared to the best estimates from those 
proposed with the aim that targets can be more 
easily achieved. There are three main reasons 
why agents engage in budgetary slack: (a) 
people always believe that their work will look 
good in the eyes of superiors if they can reach 
their budget; (b) budgetary slack is always 
used to overcome uncertain conditions. If 
there are no unforeseen events, the agent may 
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exceed/achieve his budget; (c) budget plans 
are always cut in the process of allocating 
resources (Falikhatun, 2007).
The existence of budgetary slack can 
have a negative impact on public sector 
organizations because it can cause bias in 
evaluating the performance of agents in 
terms of accountability. The existence of a 
phenomenon related to budget irregularities 
in the Special Region of Aceh in 2014 which 
caused state losses of 7.4 billion is evidence 
that the budget is at risk of fraud. In the era 
of centralization, the budgeting process was 
only carried out by managers at the middle 
and top levels. The flow of budgeting followed 
a top-down method (Masram, 2018) which was 
considered effective and efficient.
However, in the era of increasingly 
sophisticated technology, managers are aware 
of the common knowledge possessed by their 
personnel. The budgeting process is no longer 
done centrally, but in collaboration with all 
levels of the organization. Budgeting using the 
bottom-up method is an option. Employees or 
personnel are given the same right to determine 
their performance standards to be achieved 
during a period. This process is often referred 
to as participatory budgeting. Participatory 
budgeting is a budgeting process that involves 
all levels of personnel. The opportunity for 
employees to participate in preparing the 
budget is closely related to the level of gap 
in the budget. When employees are given the 
flexibility to determine the budget that is the 
benchmark for their performance, they will 
tend to set standards that are easy to achieve. 
The results of research conducted by Srimuliani 
(2014) show that participatory budgeting has a 
negative effect on budgetary slack. Meanwhile, 
research conducted by Widianingsih (2011) 
shows the opposite result that participatory 
budgeting has a positive effect on budgetary 
slack.
Information asymmetry is the difference 
in information held by the principal and the 
agent. According to Suartana (2010), budgetary 
slack will be greater if there is information 
asymmetry because information asymmetry 
encourages budget implementers to create 
budgetary slack. In this case, information 
asymmetry is the difference in information 
held by superiors and subordinates. The higher 
the information asymmetry in budgeting, the 
higher the chance of budgetary slack will be. 
The results of research conducted by Ayu 
(2014) show that information asymmetry 
has a significant effect on budgetary slack. 
However, the results of research conducted 
by Mukaromah (2018), show that information 
asymmetry has no significant effect on 
budgetary slack.
Organizational commitment can be 
interpreted as a condition where executives 
remain in an organization and are committed 
to their work. Organizational commitment can 
also be interpreted as a measure of the extent to 
which employees believe and accept the goals 
of the organization, continue to work for the 
organization, and show their performance in 
building or advancing the organization. The 
results of research conducted by Alfebriano 
(2018) show that organizational commitment 
has a negative effect on budgetary slack. 
However, the results of research conducted by 
Mukaromah (2018), show that organizational 
commitment has no effect on budgetary slack. 
Based on the background described 
above, this study is intended to empirically re-
examine the effect of participatory budgeting, 
information asymmetry, and organizational 
commitment on budgetary slack on managers 
in Surabaya.
2. THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK AND 
HYPOTHESIS 
Agency Theory
Agency theory, according to Suwardjono (2018: 
63), is related to the relationship between the 
principal and the agent. This theory shows the 
existence of information asymmetry between 
managers as agents and owners as principals 
(Idawati & Dewi, 2017). Agency theory explains 
that in the presence of information asymmetry, 
managers will choose a set of policies to 
maximize the manager’s own interests. Several 
studies measure how agency problems can 
be reduced by increasing disclosure (Almilia, 
2008).
Agency theory implies the existence of 
information asymmetry between managers 
as agents and owners as principals. The 
definition of information asymmetry is the 
existence of an imbalance of information 
provided by management in charge of carrying 
out operational activities to shareholders or 
principals. Information asymmetry arises 
when managers know more about internal 
information and company prospects in the 
future than shareholders and other stakeholders 
(Idawati and Dewi, 2017). In presenting 
accounting information, managers have more 
perfect information than company owners or 
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shareholders. This results in managers trying 
to only convey information that will maintain 
or strengthen the company’s image.
Agency theory is used to support the effect 
of information asymmetry on budgetary slack.
Leader-Member Exchange Theory (LMX 
Theory)
According to Robbins et al. (2012), the Leader-
Member Exchange theory (LMX theory) states 
that as a result of time pressure, leaders establish 
a special relationship with a small group of 
their subordinates. The individuals involved in 
the group receive unequal attention from the 
leader. The small group is divided into two: 
in-group and out-group. In-group consists of 
subordinates who are trusted by the leader. 
They get more attention and tend to get special 
rights from the leadership. In contrast, the out-
group consists of subordinates who get little 
time and little control over their performance 
from their leaders. Based on this theory, there 
is a real work gap where subordinates who 
are included in the in-group will get a higher 
performance rating (Robbins et al., 2012). The 
higher the organizational commitment owned 
by each personnel, the smaller the budget gap.
LMX theory is used to support the effect 
of budget participation and organizational 
commitment on budgetary slack.
Budgetary Slack
Budget slack is the difference between the 
proposed budget amount and the predicted 
budget estimate. Budgetary slack is a form 
of deviant behavior in budgeting. Budgetary 
slack occurs because of the desire of the budget 
maker to avoid risk and seek a sense of security. 
Budgetary slack is usually done by increasing 
costs or lowering revenues than they should so 
that the budget is easily achieved (Anthony & 
Govindaradjan, 2011).
Basically, there are 2 (two) factors that 
influence budgetary slack: external factors 
and internal factors of individuals. External 
factors include budgetary participation, 
information asymmetry, and other factors. 
Meanwhile, internal factors can be sourced 
from the individual’s personality. According to 
Alfebriano (2018), aspects of human resources 
as budget compilers and implementers must 
be considered because the budget will be 
influenced by human behavior, especially 
for those who are directly involved in the 
preparation and implementation of the 
budget. If the budget preparation does not pay 
attention to one party or the communication 
between leaders and subordinates does not 
go well, it is likely to result in failure in the 
budget system because there are parties who 
are not satisfied with the budget that has been 
prepared. For example, subordinates who 
participate in budgeting will tend to make low 
budgets, so that in practice the budget will be 
easily achieved by subordinates. This is what is 
usually called budgetary slack.
Participatory Budgeting and Budgetary Slack
Participatory budgeting provides the widest 
possible space for employees to contribute 
in preparing their own budgets. This means 
that there is flexibility for employees to 
determine the performance benchmarks that 
will be achieved during the next period. This 
will trigger the behavior of an employee to 
take advantage of existing opportunities, 
one of which is by doing budgetary slack. 
An employee of course will not make an 
achievement that will make it difficult for him. 
The employee is likely to set an achievement 
that he or she can achieve easily. This is the 
beginning of the occurrence of budgetary slack. 
Employees write down achievements that are 
not in accordance with their actual abilities 
with the aim of getting a big bonus. The results 
of research conducted by Widianingsih (2011), 
show that participatory budgeting has a 
positive influence on budgetary slack.
H1: Participatory budgeting has a positive 
effect on budgetary slack
Information Asymmetry and Budgetary Slack
Information asymmetry is the inequality of 
information owned by various parties in the 
company, in this case between managers and 
employees. Employees, as parties who are 
closely related to the market, will have more 
detailed information about the actual market 
conditions. Information held by employees 
should also be shared with other parties, 
such as managers, especially those related to 
budgeting. Otherwise, information asymmetry 
will occur which will later cause budgetary 
slack during budget preparation. The results 
of research conducted by Ayu (2014), show 
that information asymmetry has a positive 
influence on budgetary slack.
H2: Information asymmetry has a positive 
effect on budgetary slack
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Organizational Commitment and Budgetary 
Slack
Organizational commitment is a commitment 
that is owned by every active part of the 
company. When someone in a company has 
a high commitment to the company, he will 
be loyal and give the best for the company 
where he works. That way, it will minimize 
the practice of profit-taking that is carried out 
unilaterally, such as budgetary slack, in the 
preparation of a budget. The results of research 
conducted by Alfebriano (2018) show that 
organizational commitment has a negative 
effect on budgetary slack.
H3: Organizational commitment has a negative 
effect on budgetary slack
3. RESEARCH METHOD
This study is a quantitative study that examines 
numbers with statistical test analysis. The data 
used in this study is primary data collected 
through the distribution of questionnaires. The 
sample used in this study includes managers 
who are in the Surabaya area. The dependent 
variable used in this study is budgetary 
slack (Y), while the independent variables 
used consist of participatory budgeting 
(X1), information asymmetry (X2), and 
organizational commitment (X3).
This study uses primary data obtained 
directly from respondents through the 
distribution of online and offline questionnaires. 
Sampling is done by using convenience 
sampling technique because the objects used in 
this study consist of managers who are willing 
to fill out a questionnaire. Measurement of data 
in this study is conducted using a Likert scale 
associated with the respondent’s agreement or 
disagreement with a certain statement. 
The indicators used to measure the 
dependent variable of budgetary slack are as 
follows (Table 1-Table 4).
4. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
Characteristics of Respondents
Of the 150 copies of the questionnaire 
distributed, only 70 are returned in good 
condition and completely filled out, which 
means that the respondents involved in this 
study are 70 managers spread throughout 
the city of Surabaya. Based on gender, 38 
respondents are male and 32 respondents are 
female. Based on the length of work or work 
experience, the respondents have a minimum 
of 1 year experience and a maximum of 10 
years as a manager. Based on educational 
background, almost all respondents have a 
final education in bachelor’s degree. Based on 
age, the respondents are in the range between 
30 and 50 years. Based on the position, the 
positions of the respondents are as finance 




1. Standards used in the budget.
2. The level of responsibility of superiors and subordinates to the implementation of the 
budget.
3. Attitudes of superiors and subordinates towards the use of the budget.
4. The existence of targets that must be achieved by superiors or subordinates
5. The level of efficiency in using the budget by superiors and subordinates





1. The level of involvement in budgeting.
2. The level of influence of the budget revision.
3. The level of contribution of superiors in the budgeting process.
4. The level of contribution of subordinates in the budgeting process.
5. Whether the reasons for budget revision are acceptable to subordinates.
Source: Lestari (2017)
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Validity and Reliability Test
Based on the results of the validity test in Table 
5, all statement items are valid because they 
have a significance value of <0.05. Thus, all 
statement items that measure the variable of 
participatory budgeting (X1) are declared valid 
and can be used in the analysis process.
Based on the results of the validity test in 
Table 6, all statement items are valid because 
they have a significance value of <0.05. Thus, 
all statement items that measure the variable of 
information asymmetry (X2) are declared valid 
and can be used in the analysis process.
Based on the results of the validity test in 
Table 7, all statement items are valid because 
they have a significance value of <0.05. Thus, 
all statement items that measure the variable of 
organizational commitment (X3) are declared 
valid and can be used in the analysis process.
Based on the results of the validity test in 
Table 8, all statement items are valid because 
they have a significance value of <0.05. Thus, 
all statement items that measure the variable of 
budgetary slack (Y) are declared valid and can 




1. The amount of information held by subordinates regarding the activities of the 
organization.
2. How big the potential performance of subordinates in the organization.
3. The degree of relationship between inputs and outputs that exist in internal operations
4. The level of assessment of external factors.





1. The level of an employee’s ability to complete his / her duties.
2. The level of concern for the future of the organization.
3. How employees tell the condition of their organization to outsiders.
Source: Andika (2010)
Table 5
Results of Validity Test of Participatory Budgeting (X1)
Statement Pearson Sig. Conclusion
X1.1 0.570 0.011 Valid
X1.2 0.693 0.000 Valid
X1.3 0.720 0.000 Valid
X1.4 0.859 0.000 Valid
X1.5 0.411 0.017 Valid
Source: Processed Data
Table 6
Results of Validity Test of Information Asymmetry (X2)
Statement Pearson Sig. Conclusion
X.2.1 0740 0.000 Valid
X.2.2 0.823 0.000 Valid
X.2.3 0.817 0.000 Valid
X.2.4 0.983 0.000 Valid
X.2.5 0.864 0.000 Valid
Source: Processed Data
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The results of the reliability test in Table 
9 show that the variables of Participatory 
Budgeting, Information Asymmetry, Organi-
zational Commitment, and Budgetary Slack 
have a value of more than 0.60. Therefore, all 
of these variables are declared reliable.
Descriptive Statistics Test
The results of the descriptive statistical 
test in Table 10 show that the average value 
of the variables of budget participation, 
organizational commitment, and budgetary 
slack is quite high, while information 
asymmetry shows a fairly low average value.
Table 7
Results of Validity Test of Organizational Commitment (X3)
Statement Pearson Sig. Conclusion
X.3.1 0.685 0.000 Valid
X.3.2 0.853 0.000 Valid
X.3.3 0.562 0..001 Valid
X.3.4 0.679 0.000 Valid
X.3.5 0.845 0.000 Valid
X.3.6 0.823 0.000 Valid
X.3.7 0.764 0.000 Valid
X.3.8 0.720 0.000 Valid
X.3.9 0.742 0.000 Valid
Source: Processed Data
Table 8
Results of Validity Test of Budgetary Slack (Y)
Statement Pearson Sig. Conclusion
Y.1 0.634 0.000 Valid
Y.2 0.685 0.000 Valid
Y.3 0.724 0.000 Valid
Y.4 0.284 0.035 Valid
Y.5 0.718 0.000 Valid
Y.6 0.769 0.000 Valid
Source: Processed Data
Table 9
Results of Reliability Test
Variable Cronbach’s Alpha Conclusion
Participatory Budgeting 0.835 Reliable
Information Asymmetry 0.876 Reliable
Organizational Commitment 0.935 Reliable
Budgetary Slack 0.773 Reliable
Source: Processed Data
Table 10
Results of Descriptive Statistics Test
No Variable Mean Max Min
1 Participatory Budgeting 3.125 3.398 2.217
2 Information Asymmetry 2.317 2.612 2.229
3 Organizational Commitment 3.176 3.372 2.592
4 Budgetary Slack 3.001 3.402 2.016
Source: Processed Data




The results of the normality test in Table 11 
using the Kolmogorov Smirnov test show the 
value of Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) is 0.219, or > 
0.05. So, it can be said that the value of the data 
is significant, which means that the data in this 
study is normally distributed.
The results of multicollinearity test using 
the calculation of the tolerance value in Table 
12 show that there is no independent variable 
that has a tolerance value of less than 0.1, which 
means that there is no correlation between 
the independent variables. The results of the 
calculation of the Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF) value also show the same results, with 
the VIF value for each independent variable of 
1. So there is no independent variable that has 
a VIF value of more than 10. If the VIF value is 
< 10, it can be concluded that the data have no 
symptoms of multicollinearity.
The results of heteroscedasticity test using 
the glejser test in Table 13 show that the sig. 
value of each variable is greater than 0.05, 
which means that in this regression model there 
are no symptoms of heteroscedasticity in the 
variables of budget participation, information 
asymmetry, and organizational commitment.
Hypothesis Testing Results
Based on the results of Table 14, the value 
of Adjusted R2 is 0.370. This shows that the 
percentage of the influence of the independent 
variable on the dependent variable is 37%, 
which means that the variation of the 
independent variable used in the model is 
able to explain 37% of the variation in the 
dependent variable, while the remaining 63% 
is influenced or explained by other variables 
that are not included in this research model.
Multiple linear regression testing shows 
the following results:
Y = 6.873 + 0.026 (PB)  + 0.186 (IA) + 0.270  
       (OC) + e
Note: 
PB = Participatory Budgeting
IA = Information Asymmetry
Table 11
Results of Normality Test
Unstandardized residual
N 70
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0.219
Source: Processed Data
Table 12
Results of Multicollinearity Test
Model Collinearity Statistics
(Constant) Tol VIF
Participatory Budgeting 0.812 1.232
Information Asymmetry 0.823 1.215
Organizational commitment 0.934 1.071
Source: Processed Data
Table 13 
Results of Heteroscedasticity Test
Model Sig.
Participatory Budgeting (PB) 0.482
Information Asymmetry (IA) 0.256
Organizational Commitment (OC) 0.766
Source: Processed Data
Table 14
Results of Coefficient of Determination (R2) Test 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error pf the estimate
.608 .370 .341 1.458
Source: Processed Data
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OC = Organizational Commitment
e = Value of error term
a. The coefficient of the constant value of 
6.873 indicates that if the value of the 
independent variables of participatory 
budgeting (X1), information asymmetry 
(X2) and organizational commitment (X3) 
is 0, the level of budgetary slack is 6.873.
b. The regression coefficient (β1) for the 
variable of participatory budgeting (X1) 
is 0.026. This means that if participatory 
budgeting increases by one unit, the 
budgetary slack (Y) will increase by 0.026 
units, assuming the other independent 
variables have a fixed value.
c. The regression coefficient (β2) for the 
variable of information asymmetry (X2) 
is 0.186. This means that if information 
asymmetry increases by one unit, the 
budgetary slack (Y) will increase by 0.186 
units, assuming the other independent 
variables have a fixed value.
d. The regression coefficient (β3) for the 
variable of organizational commitment (X3) 
is 0.270. This means that if organizational 
commitment increases by one unit, the 
budgetary slack (Y) will decrease by 0.270 
units, assuming the other independent 
variables have a fixed value.
The results of the t-test in table 16 show 
that the budget participation variable is 
declared insignificant with a significance 
value of 0.794 > 0.05, which means that the 
first hypothesis cannot be accepted. The 
information asymmetry variable was declared 
significant with a significance value of 0.009 < 
0.05, which means that the second hypothesis 
can be accepted. Organizational Commitment 
variable is declared significant with a 
significance value of 0.000 < 0.005, which means 
that the third hypothesis can be accepted.
DISCUSSION
The Effect of Participatory Budgeting on 
Budgetary Slack
The results of the regression test show that 
participatory budgeting has no effect on 
budgetary slack. This means that the high 
and low level of participation of a manager 
in preparing the budget will not affect the 
occurrence of budgetary slack. When a manager 
has a larger share in preparing the budget, he is 
likely to pour all his knowledge of the market 
into budgeting so that the resulting budget is 
the ideal budget to run for a period. However, 
it can also happen the other way around, a high 
opportunity in preparing a budget can be used 
as a gap for a manager to be able to do budgetary 
slack. Therefore, participatory budgeting has 
no effect on budgetary slack. The results of this 
study are in line with the results of research 
conducted by I Gusti Agung (2014) and I Made 
Bagas (2014) that participatory budgeting 
has no significant effect on budgetary slack. 
However, the results of this study do not 
support the results of research conducted by 
Aliati Mukaromah (2018) which show that 
participatory budgeting has a significant effect 
on budgetary slack.
Table 15
Rsults of Regression Test
Variable Unstandardized coefficients Standard coefficient
B Std error Beta
(Constant) 6.873 1.878
Participatory Budgeting 0.026 0.098 0.028
Information Asymmetry 0.186 0.069 0.291




Variable t Sig. Conclusion
Participatory Budgeting 0.263 0.794 Not significant
Information Asymmetry 2.699 0.009 Significant
Organizational Commitment 4.609 0.000 Significant
Source: Processed Data
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The Effect of Information Asymmetry on 
Budgetary Slack
Information asymmetry can be used as a gap 
by managers to hide information about their 
performance. This causes a lack of motivation 
to improve results because of their inability 
and they cover it up by providing unclear 
information. So it can be said that information 
asymmetry is a trigger for budgetary slack. 
The use of information asymmetry to perform 
budgetary slack shows a difference in goals and 
interests between subordinates and superiors. 
This is in line with agency theory which states 
that the principal, or the CEO, has an orientation 
in improving organizational performance, 
while the agent, or manager, is more oriented 
towards bonuses or incentives that can be 
obtained. In participatory budgeting, a high 
level of information asymmetry will be utilized 
by subordinates to carry out budgetary slack. 
Therefore, the higher the level of information 
asymmetry, the higher the opportunity for 
subordinates to do budgetary slack because 
superiors do not know their performance 
capabilities. According to the Leader Member 
Exchange Theory (LMX Theory), trust in the 
form of responsibility given by the leader to 
subordinates to prepare a budget will of course 
provide opportunities for subordinates to 
create slack because subordinates will prepare 
a budget that is easy to achieve so that the 
performance of the organization is considered 
good and ultimately the leader will reward the 
budget maker. In this case, the preparation of 
the budget is intended to meet the personal 
goals of subordinates, not for organizational 
goals. The results of this study are in line 
with the results of research conducted by 
Alfebriano (2018) that information asymmetry 
has a significant effect on budgetary slack. 
However, the results of this study are not in 
line with the results of research conducted by 
Aliati Mukaromah (2015) which shows that 
information asymmetry has no significant 
effect on budgetary slack.
The Effect of Organizational Commitment on 
Budgetary Slack
Managers who have a high commitment 
will use the budget to get the bonuses they 
expect. According to the Leader Member 
Exchange Theory (LMX Theory), managers 
who are committed to their organization will 
be determined not to lower or leave their 
organization and will always strive to produce 
a higher level of work. Managers who have high 
organizational commitment will work in the 
interests of their organization and be loyal to 
their organization. A manager will do anything 
to stay in his position. One of them is to make 
it look as if the manager’s performance is good, 
with the achievement of the budgeted targets. 
Of course this will encourage a manager to do 
budgetary slack. This is in accordance with 
the results of the significance test which state 
that the relationship between organizational 
commitment and budgetary slack is positive. 
The higher the commitment of a manager to 
an organization, the higher the tendency to do 
budgetary slack. The results of the study are 
in line with the results of research conducted 
by Alfebriano (2018) that organizational 
commitment has a negative effect on budgetary 
slack. However, the results of this study are not 
in line with the results of research conducted 
by Aliati (2015) which state that organizational 
commitment has no effect on budgetary slack..
5. CONCLUSION, IMPLICATION, SUG-
GESTION AND LIMITATION
Conclusion
This study aims to determine the effect 
of participatory budgeting, information 
asymmetry, and organizational commitment 
on budgetary slack. Respondents in this study 
consist of managers in the city of Surabaya. 
Based on the results of research and discussion, 
it can be concluded as follows:
a. Participatory budgeting has no effect 
on budgetary slack. This means that 
the level of participation in budgeting 
in an organization is not a guarantee to 
improve managerial performance. This is 
due to good control from the company’s 
internal so that the level of participation 
of a manager in budgeting will not affect 
budgetary slack
b. Information asymmetry has an effect on 
budgetary slack. This means that the higher 
the information asymmetry, the higher 
the possibility of budgetary slack. This is 
because subordinates have the flexibility 
to manage the information they have. The 
high information asymmetry held between 
subordinates and superiors tends to create 
budgetary slack for personal gain.
c. Organizational commitment has an effect 
on budgetary slack. This means that the 
higher the organizational commitment, 
the higher the budgetary slack that occurs. 
This is because the employees who work 
for the organization are very supportive 
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of the organization’s goals so that they 
will make budget targets that are easy to 
achieve.
Suggestion
Based on the results of the research that has 
been concluded above, it is recommended that:
a. The next researchers determine the 
appropriate time for distributing the 
questionnaire so that the number of 
returned questionnaires can be maximized.
b. The next researchers distribute the 
questionnaires in full with the offline 
method so that the process of filling out the 
questionnaires carried out by respondents 
can be monitored and controlled.
Limitation
This study has several limitations and 
weaknesses that may affect the results of 
the study. Therefore, future researchers are 
expected to consider some of these limitations 
and weaknesses, such as:
a. The collection of questionnaire data 
coincided with the hectic period or the 
end of the year so that the number of 
questionnaires returned was relatively 
small due to the limited number of 
respondents.
b. The distribution of questionnaires was 
done online so that the control carried out 
by researcher tended to be low.
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